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Abstract Using a sample of 20 OECD countries it is shown that the ma-
jority of countries decreased the level of intragenerational redistribution in
the ﬁrst pillar of their pension systems, though the evidence is weak in sta-
tistical terms. We ﬁnd strong correlations between changes of the so-called
Bismarckian factor and changes of the generosity of the pension system, the
shape of the income distribution in terms of its ﬁrst three central moments
and life expectancy. An economic laboratory experiment conﬁrms that these
variables could have been causal for the observed change.
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Recent studies suggested that the degree of intragenerational redistribution
in the ﬁrst pillar of many OECD countries’ pension systems has been de-
creasing over the last two decades (see, e.g., Fenge et al., 2003; Lindbeck and
Persson, 2003; Queisser, 2000; and Werding, 2003). Our study empirically
tests this hypothesis using microdata taken from the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS). In order to estimate the level of intragenerational redistribu-
tion in the public pension system, we employ the Bismarckian factor (see,
e.g., Hassler and Lindbeck, 1997; and Cremer and Pestieau, 1998). Concep-
tionally, the Bismarckian factor divides the pension beneﬁt into a ﬂat com-
ponent (such as a basic or minimum pension) and into an earnings-related
component: the higher the Bismarckian factor, the more important is the
earnings-related part and, thus, the smaller is the degree of intragenerational
redistribution (under the proviso that contributions are collected as payroll
taxes). A pension system that emphasizes the earnings-related component
(such as in France or Germany) is called a Bismarckian pension system. If
the pension system accentuates the ﬂat beneﬁt part (such as in the UK), it
is called Beveridgean.
Our study considers pension systems in 20 OECD countries. Depending
on data availability, we used data for the time period from 1985 to 2000.
In line with the studies mentioned above, we empirically observe for most
countries an increase of the Bismarckian factor that was accompanied by
an increase of the “generosity” of the pension system (the share of pension
beneﬁts in total household income).1 In 14 countries, the Bismarckian fac-
1The negative correlation between the level of intragenerational redistribution and the
2tor increased; in 11 cases both the level of intragenerational redistribution
decreased and the generosity increased. It should be noted, however, that
the increases of the Bismarckian factor as well as the generosity index are
statistically insigniﬁcant at conventional terms. Hence, though we approve
our initial question that OECD pension systems actually tend to move“back
to Bismarck”, the empirical evidence is relatively weak.
The core of our analysis, however, is formed by the identiﬁcation of eco-
nomic factors that through political processes could exert inﬂuence on the
level of intragenerational redistribution in a country’s pension system. In our
paper, we mainly focus on two aspects that are likely to be important. First,
during the observation period, the income distributions of the 20 OECD
countries considered have changed dramatically. Not only real per capita
GDP has risen, but also the variance and the skewness of the income distri-
bution have increased. It does not seem to be too farfetched to assume that
these developments have somehow inﬂuenced the perceived level of inequal-
ity in the society and shaped redistribution policy (though the causality may
be mutual). Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007) recently emphasized the deci-
sive role of inequality for the level of intragenerational redistribution in the
pension system. With substantial inequality, a winning coalition of the rich
and the poor could implement a Beveridgean pension system, while a low
degree of inequality would allow the middle-class to introduce a Bismarckian
system.2 Second, the average life expectancy of a male person at the age of
size of the pension system also was investigated by, for example, Cremer and Pestieau,
1998; Casamatta et al., 2000a, 2000b; K¨ othenb¨ urger et al., 2008; and Rossignol and Tau-
gourdeau, 2006).
2This outcome resembles to some degree the “paradox of redistribution”by Korpi and
365 has increased by about one and a half months per year. However, the
gain in life years was probably not uniformly distributed. Evidence for a
positive eﬀect of wealth on life expectancy has been provided, for example,
by Attanasio and Emerson (2003) or Deaton and Paxson (2001). So, the rel-
ative importance of retirement arrangements has increased, and the increase
has been more intense for the rich. A positive eﬀect of income on life ex-
pectancy is known to make a pension system regressive (see Coronado et al.,
2000; Gil and Lopez-Casanovas, 1998; and Reil-Held, 2000). These ﬁndings
also are consistent with Borck (2007) and Gorski et al. (2007) who showed
formally that a positive correlation between income and longevity dampens
redistribution from rich to poor in pension systems.
We choose a twofold approach to investigate these questions. In the ﬁrst
part of the analysis, we present empirical facts based on LIS data as to the
change of OECD pension systems, income distributions, and life expectancy.
Results are reported in terms of descriptive statistics and a correlation analy-
sis. Due to data limitations and unclear causal relationships of the empirical
analysis, the second part of the paper presents an economic laboratory ex-
periment where subjects had to chose the Bismarckian factor representing a
hypothetical social security system. The experiment involved 18 treatments
mimicking exogenous changes in the generosity of the pension system, in
the shape of the income distribution and both symmetric and asymmetric
increases of life expectancy.
In our experiment, we basically followed the so-called individual choice
Palme (1998), which has been supported empirically in the context of pension systems by
Lef` ebvre (2007).
4approach to social welfare which was developed by Friedman (1953) and
Harsanyi (1953, 1955).3 Our subjects were induced by the experimental de-
sign to act as involved social planners. They evaluated income distributions
from under a veil of ignorance, that is, they became a member of the re-
spective society after having done their choices, but they did not know their
own future income positions in advance. Note that the experiment involved
considerable monetary payoﬀs of up to e1,050. The individual choice ap-
proach was also employed by Bernasconi (2002), Bosmans and Schokkaert
(2004), and Traub et al. (2005, 2008) in order to test various hypotheses
concerning perceptions of justice and the consistency of choice behavior in
income distribution contexts. In terms of the individual choice approach,
income distributions resemble lotteries. The principle of insuﬃcient reason
implies that the social planner imagines that the chance of being any person
in the society is equally likely. Equal consideration is given to every member
of the society, thereby guaranteeing impartiality of the social planner. Ac-
cordingly, the social planner is assumed to choose that income distribution
that maximizes the expected utility.
Apart from theoretical concerns (see, for example, Mongin, 2001), the
literature suggests that the relationship between a social planner’s distribu-
tional preferences and income distributions is more complex than stated by
3The large existing body of experimental literature concerned with redistribution prob-
lems comprises, for example, Amiel and Cowell, 1992, 2000; Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo,
1993; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1994; Harrison and Seidl, 1994a, 1994b; Bernasconi,
2002; Bosmans and Schokkaert, 2004; Traub et al., 2005, 2008. However, to our best
knowledge this is the ﬁrst study to contrast empirical ﬁndings concerning the change of
institutions such as the pension system with experimental micro data.
5the impartial observer theorem. Recent research has shown that inequal-
ity and risk preferences are not the same (on this issue, see Cowell and
Schokkaert, 2001). Bernasconi (2002) questioned both the utilitarian ap-
proach to social welfare and the non-utilitarian approach like Rawls’ (1971)
maximin criterion to be a meaningful description of distributional prefer-
ences. Instead, he found some evidence of randomization preferences, that
is, a procedural fairness motive (Diamond, 1967) which violates the betwee-
ness axiom of expected utility theory. Likewise, in an experimental “beauty
contest” of social welfare functions Traub et al. (2005) demonstrated that a
quadratic social welfare function (Epstein and Segal, 1992) which expresses
randomization preferences performed remarkably well. As a consequence of
such procedural fairness motives entering the self-interested social planner’s
preference, she is likely to avoid extreme outcomes in terms of insuﬃciently
low or excessively high incomes (see Traub et al., 2008).
A hypothesis that goes remarkably well with these observations is Bould-
ing’s (1962, p. 83) proposition that “society lays a modest table at which
all can sup and a high table at which the deserving can feast”. Boulding’s
hypothesis translates into a lexicographic social welfare function. First, the
social planner takes care that everyone in the society (including himself)
obtains enough to make ends meet. The income threshold associated with
it may be called living wage, subsistence level, or poverty line. Then, for
incomes above that threshold, the social planner’s preferences are best ex-
pressed by maximizing the average or expected utility of the society (as
assumed by Friedman-Harsanyi). In the ignorance scenario (no probabil-
ity information was given) of the Traub et al. (2005) “beauty contest” of
6social welfare functions, the Boulding social welfare function was the best
performing standard of behavior among all subjects; it was among the four
top performers in the risk scenario.
Further complications seem to arise from the fact that the evaluation of
incomes is context dependent. Whether an income is perceived as barely
suﬃcient or excellent does not only depend on its absolute value but also on
the background context in terms of the overall shape of the income distri-
bution. The concept of relative deprivation, tracing back to Stouﬀer et al.
(1949) and advanced by Runciman (1966) and others, provides the missing
link between income evaluation and societal context.4 Generically, relative
deprivation describes a subjectively perceived lack of something in relation
to a societal reference value (for example, a hot breakfast). The link between
relative deprivation and a society’s degree of inequality aversion was high-
lighted by the philosopher Temkin (1986, 1993) who argued that inequality
aversion was driven by the complaints of the poor about their situation in
relation to that of the rich. Devooght (2003) found experimental support
for Temkin’s model. Seidl et al. (2006) used Parducci’s (1965, 1968, 1974,
1982) range-frequency theory in order to experimentally investigate the con-
text dependence of the assessment of income distributions. They showed that
positively skewed income distributions (which happen to be the normal case
in OECD countries) generate more relative deprivation at the societal level
than negatively skewed income distributions. Our empirical observation that
the skewness of the OECD countries’ income distributions annually increased
4The literature on the economics of happiness (see, e.g., Oswald, 1997; and Easterlin,
2001) heavily relies on the concept of relative deprivation.
7by more than 3% since 1985 leaves us anticipating an upswell of complaint.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we formally
discuss the Bismarckian factor and present the empirical analysis based on
LIS microdata for 20 OECD countries. The experiment is presented in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 provides an extensive discussion of our results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Empirical Facts
2.1 Deﬁning the Bismarckian factor
In order to derive a workable and intuitive representation of the level of intra-
generational redistribution in a pension system, we deﬁne the Bismarckian
factor along the lines of the “index of non-contributiveness” (INC) (Lefbvre
and Pestieau, 2006; Lefbvre 2007). INC, denoted by β, is deﬁned as the ratio
of the income share of public pensions in the bottom quintile, B,t ot h es a m e











where Yi and Pi, i ∈{ B,2,3,4,T}, are the mean income and the mean
pension beneﬁt, respectively, of the ith quintile of the income distribution.
A purely Beveridgean pension system which pays equal beneﬁts to every
citizen implies PB = PT, such that βbev = YT/YB (≥ 1). If beneﬁts are
solely earnings-related, the respective purely Bismarckian pension system
yields PB/YB = PT/YT and, therefore, βbis = 1. Note that due to β ∈
[1,Y T/YB] INC is not normalized which is a bit unfavorable for cross-country
8comparisons.
We use the deﬁnition of the pension beneﬁt of a representative member of
quintile i in order to derive the Bismarckian factor. Pi is deﬁned as a convex
combination of a ﬂat payment (proportional to the mean income) and an
earnings-related component (see Casamatta et al., 2000a):
Pi = τ [αYi +( 1− α)μ], (2)
where α ∈ [0,1] is the Bismarckian factor and μ ≡

i Yi/5 is the mean of
the society’s income distribution. A measurement of the generosity of the






Henceforth, we will refer to τ as the“generosity index”.
We plug equation (2) into the ratio of the pension beneﬁts of the bottom
a n dt h et o pq u i n t i l ePB/PT (the left fraction in the deﬁnition of INC). Since
τ drops out, solving this expression for α gives the Bismarckian factor
α ≡
(PT − PB) · μ
(PT − PB) · μ − PTYB + PBYT
. (4)
A purely Beveridgean pension system (PB = PT) yields αbev = 0 and a purely
Bismarckian pension system (PB/YB = PT/YT)g i v e sαbis = 1. Hence, as
desired the Bismarckian factor is normalized6 on the closed interval [0,1] and
5Note that this parameter could be interpreted as the pension system’s replacment ratio,
thereby also capturing intergenerational redistributive elements in the pension formula,
which are, however, not explicitly build into our approach.
6Alternatively, we can write α ≡ [(PT − PB) · μ]/[(PT − PB) · μ + PTYB · (β − 1)],
highlighting that the Bismarckian factor is in fact a normalization of the INC.
9is also independent of the generosity τ of the pension system. Accordingly, α
is not only a pure measure of intragenerational redistribution but also allows
for cross-country comparisons of public pension systems of diﬀerent size.
2.2 The Data
For the empirical analysis, we used microdata taken from the Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS, 2008). It provides internationally comparable and reli-
able data on income distributions (see Atkinson, 2004). The LIS data were
employed for computing the values of the Bismarckian factor α and the gen-
erosity index τ. Furthermore, LIS data were used in order to compute the
ﬁrst three central moments of the income distribution (mean, variance, skew-
ness).
The following countries were included in our data set: Austria (ﬁrst year:
1985, last year: 2003), Australia (1987, 2000), Belgium (1985, 2000), Canada
(1987, 2000), Denmark (1987, 2004), Finland (1987, 2000), France (1984,
2000), Germany (1984, 2000), Greece (1995, 2000), Ireland (1987, 2000), Italy
(1986, 2000), Luxembourg (1985, 2000), Mexico (1984, 2002), the Nether-
lands (1983, 1999), Norway (1986, 2002), Spain (1990, 2000), Sweden (1987,
2000), Switzerland (1982, 2002), the United Kingdom (1986, 1999) and the
United States (1986, 2000). Apart from rare exemptions in terms of radical
system changes, large aggregates such as pension systems transform them-
selves only gradually. Hence, we looked at the longest available time period
for each country. In most cases, the earliest wave providing us with the nec-
essary data was Wave II (around 1985), the latest wave available at the time
this research was conducted was Wave V and Wave VI in some cases (around
102000).
All LIS data employed in our analysis refer to the household level. The
household is the most natural economic unit to focus on as its members
jointly plan on earning and spending income. At the household level, we
have to distinguish between “raw”and equivalized household net income. In
order to compute the Bismarckian factor as well as the generosity of the pen-
sion system, we used “raw”household net income. That is, α and τ measure
the legal status of the pension system as it was reﬂected in the respective
income distribution. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we shall explore
correlations between changes in the income distribution and the pension sys-
tem. Therefore, when computing the moments of the income distribution,
we employed equivalized household net income. By adjusting the income dis-
tribution for the diﬀerent needs of diﬀerent household types, we based this
part of our analysis on household welfare. Note that we used the household
weights provided by LIS in order to weight cases. Furthermore, if necessary,
income data was adjusted for inﬂation using the consumer price index with
the last LIS year of the respective country as the base year (data source:
OECD Main Indicators).
LIS reports household net income in an aggregate variable (LIS variable:
DPI). For computing the moments of the income distribution, it was ad-
justed for diﬀering needs by using the square root of household size (D4) as
weights. As recommended by LIS, the equivalized income data were bottom-
and top-coded.7 The variable “state old-age and survivors beneﬁts” (V19)
7Equivalized household net incomes smaller than 1% of the mean equivalized income
were recoded as 1% of the mean equivalized income. Household net incomes larger than 10
11provided us with the data required for computing the (unequivalized) mean
pension beneﬁts of the income quintiles.8 Note that V19 provides a broad
measure of intragenerational redistribution, including — in addition to min-
imum pensions — diﬀerent non-insurance beneﬁts such as beneﬁts due to
education, unemployment, maternity etc. (see, for example, B¨ orsch-Supan
and Reil-Held, 2001).9
2.3 Changes of α and τ
Figure 1 displays the changes of the Bismarckian factor and the generosity
index. Each of the 20 countries considered has two markers referring to the
ﬁrst and the last year of analysis (country codes are listed in Table 1). The
horizontal axis refers to the generosity index, while the vertical axis states
the Bismarckian factor. Sweden kept the most generous pension system: in
1987 the share of pensions in total household net income was about 27.9%.
As compared to this, Mexico’s 1984 pension system was virtually negligi-
ble (2.9%). In the year 2000 France maintained the pension system with
the lowest degree of intragenerational redistribution (α =0 .764). In some
cases, the Bismarckian factor turned out to be outside the theoretical [0,1]
times the median unequivalized incomes were recoded as ten times the median household
net income weighted by the square root of household size.
8Note that the disaggregated variables V19S1a (“universal old-age pensions”) and
V19S1b (“employment-related old-age pensions”) would have been more suitable but were
available only from Wave IV on.
9Some of these beneﬁts, such as beneﬁts due to education times, may be regressive.
Therefore, there may be a slight downward bias in the Bismarckian factor as compared to
a scenario where only minimum pensions are considered.
12Figure 1: Changes of Bismarckian factor and generosity index
interval: for Australia and Finland in the past and for Denmark and Nor-
way in the present, we recorded slightly negative values for the Bismarckian
factor. These countries had or still have an almost purely Beveridgean pen-
sion system, where additionally high-income earners do not receive the (full)
minimum pension.
Table 1 classiﬁes the countries according to their changes in the Bismarck-
ian factor and the generosity index. The generosity of most pension systems
seems to have increased. Likewise, for six countries only (Denmark, Greece,
13Table 1: Classiﬁcation of countries
Generosity Bismarckian factor
index increased decreased
increased Austria (AU) Denmark (DK)
Belgium (BE) Greece (GR)
Canada (CA) Luxembourg (LU)








decreased Australia (AT) Netherlands (NL)
Germany (DE) Sweden (SE)
United Kingdom (UK)
14Table 2: Changes of Bismarckian factor and generosity index
Variable Mean Level of
signiﬁcance
Bismarckian factor (α)0 .524 0.106
Generosity index (τ)0 .109 0.165
Table notes. n = 20. Annual changes in percent-
age points.
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden), we had to record a
decreasing Bismarckian factor.10
One might wonder whether the observed changes of α and τ are signiﬁ-
cant. In order to test this, we computed the annual changes of both variables
in percentage points (this proceeding allows for country-speciﬁc time spans).
Table 2 shows that neither the change in α (about 0.5 percentage points per
year) nor the change in τ (about 0.1 percentage points per year) are signif-
icant at conventional terms. Another interesting result, which can be taken
from Table 3, is that both, the absolute levels and the changes of Bismarckian
factor and generosity of the pension system were highly correlated. As dis-
cussed in the literature, less redistributive pension systems are usually larger
(though this relationship seems to have diminished a bit). Furthermore, most
10Note that in Lindbeck and Persson (2003) and Werding (2003), Denmark, Greece and
Sweden are considered as countries that reduced intragenerational redistribution in their
pension systems. At least in Denmark and Sweden the relevant major pension reforms
were enacted at the time of collecting the data for Wave V. Hence, these reforms are not
covered by our data.
15Table 3: Correlation between Bismarckian factor and generosity of the pen-
sion system
Variables Coeﬃcient Level of
signiﬁcance
αpast, τpast 0.673 0.001
αpresent, τpresent 0.499 0.025
Δα,Δ τ 0.578 0.008
Table notes. Pearson correlations. n = 20.
pension reforms have taken place on the main diagonal of Figure 1 (or Table
1), that is, increases of α came along with increases of τ.
Technically, the reduction of the level of intragenerational redistribution
came about in very diﬀerent forms in the latest pension reforms (see, for
example, Casey et al., 2003). The most fundamental change certainly being
the switch from a deﬁned-beneﬁt to a deﬁned-contribution system as in Italy
and Sweden, which is the “most Bismarckian” speciﬁcation among the dif-
ferent types of pay-as-you-go systems. Other reforms included altering the
reference earnings with respect to which pensions are calculated, for example,
by moving from“best years”to a“period average”, by increasing the number
of contribution years required to obtain a full pension, or by changing the
method of calculating the reference earnings. All these reforms tightened the
link between individual earnings and future pension beneﬁts.
Summarizing this part of the analyis, we are inclined to answer the ques-
tion: “Back to Bismarck?” in the aﬃrmative as most countries have un-
16dertaken pension reforms that reduced intragenerational redistribution. It
should be kept in mind, however, that as far as the average trend is con-
cerned the result is rather weak in statistical terms.
2.4 Changes in the Shape of the Income Distribution
and Life Expectancy
In this subsection, we consider changes of the mean, the coeﬃcient of vari-
ation11 and the skewness (the standardized third central moment) of the
income distribution. Furthermore, we consider changes in life expectancy.
These are captured by the residual life expectancy of a male aged 65. The
respective data is taken from the 2005 OECD Health Data set. Table 4
presents the changes in the shape of the income distribution and life ex-
pectancy over time. Additionally, we report the changes in household size
and the Gini coeﬃcient (the Gini coeﬃcient is listed in the LIS“keyﬁgures”).
Figures are stated in terms of annual changes in percent (income, household
size), percentage points (Gini coeﬃcient12) or expected life years, allowing
for the diﬀerent time spans that we had available for the 20 OECD countries.
Mean equivalized household net income on average increased by 1.6% per
year. Note that the average household size shrunk signiﬁcantly by more than
0.5% per year and thus contributed to the increase of equivalized household
income. Without this demographic eﬀect, the annual increase in mean in-
11We employ the coeﬃcient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean) instead
of the variance because it is scale invariant.
12Since the Gini coeﬃcient is normalized on the [0,1] interval, we consider absolute
instead of relative changes.
17come would have been only 1.23% which still is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The coeﬃcient of variation annually rose a bit more than 0.6% (signiﬁcant
at the 10% level). Much more pronounced was the change of the income
distribution is terms of its skewness. On average, OECD countries’ income
distributions have become signiﬁcantly more positively skewed, as the an-
nual increase of the skewness coeﬃcient indicates (3.1%). Both coeﬃcient
of variance and skewness reﬂect a strong and signiﬁcant increase in income
inequality. As can be taken from the table, the additionally reported Gini
coeﬃcient increased by a bit less than 0.1 percentage points per year. The
relatively modest increase in the Gini coeﬃcient as compared to coeﬃcient of
variation and the skewness is easily explained. Due to the transfer principle,
a rise in the variance of the income distribution unambiguously makes the
Gini coeﬃcient larger. This increase, however, may be counteracted by a
left shift of the median income: if the skewness of the income distribution
increases, a measurement of lower inequality at the bottom of the income
distribution is implied.
Table 4 also reports the annual change in life expectancy in terms of
expected life years of a person at the age of 65 is given. The coeﬃcient of
0.127 corresponds to a strong increase in life expectancy of about 1.5 months
per year.
2.5 Correlation Analysis
Table 5 gives the correlations between the variables listed in Table 4 and Bis-
marckian factor α and generosity index τ, respectively. The Bismarckian fac-
tor exhibits positive correlations with mean income, coeﬃcient of variation,
18Table 4: Change of income distribution and life expectancy over time
Variable Mean Level
of Signiﬁcance
Mean incomea 1.609 0.001
Coeﬃcient of variationa 0.641 0.063
Skewnessa 3.104 0.008
Life expectancyc 0.127 0.000
Household sizea -0.547 0.000
Gini coeﬃcientb 0.092 0.052
Table notes. n = 20. Annual changes. aPercent.
bPercentage points. cExpected life years.
and life expectancy. We observe negative correlations between Bismarckian
factor and skewness as well as household size. However, only life expectancy
is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Interestingly, mean, coeﬃcient of variation,
and skewness exhibit positive bivariate correlations, where the correlation
between the coeﬃcient of variation and skewness is particularly strong and
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Hence, although coeﬃcient of variation and skew-
ness both increased and were highly correlated, their bivariate relationship
with the Bismarckian factor was oppositional.
In contrast to the Bismarckian factor, the generosity of the pension sys-
tem shows a negative but insigniﬁcant correlation with mean, coeﬃcient of
variation, and skewness. Only life expectancy shows a slightly positive corre-
lation. Life expectancy exhibits positive correlations with mean income and
19Table 5: Bivariate correlations
Coeﬃcient Life HH
τ Mean of variation Skewness Expectancy Size
α 0.578** 0.021 0.179 −0.266 0.472* −0.184
τ — −0.175 −0.150 −0.199 0.076 −0.159
Mean — 0.326 0.243 0.186 −0.352
C. of Var. — 0.745** 0.089 −0.285
Skewness — −0.131 −0.046
Life Exp. — −0.007
Table notes. n = 20. Pearson correlations. Annual changes of the variables
in percentage points (α, τ), percent (mean, coeﬃcient of variance, skewness,
household size) or expected life years. **p ≤ .01, *p ≤ .05.
20coeﬃcient of variance and a negative correlation with skewness. As expected,
(the change in) household size is negatively correlated with (the change in)
mean income which is, to some extent, an eﬀect of using equivalized house-
hold income.
Of course, bivariate correlations can only give a ﬁrst impression of the
complex empirical relationships between these variables. In order to learn
more about the change of the pension system in OECD countries, we per-
formed OLS estimations with the Bismarckian factor and the generosity of
the pension system as the left-hand variables and the income variables as
well as life expectancy as the right-hand variables.13 We avoid the terms en-
dogenous and exogenous variables since we do not claim at this point of the
analysis that there is any clear causal relationship among them. Note that
we used regression through the origin because zero changes in the right-hand
variables should be associated with zero changes in the pension systems.14
Table 6 presents the results of the OLS regressions. In this section, we
only give a brief account of the ﬁgures stated in the table. We will discuss
them in detail together with the results of the experiment in the Section 4.
First, we comment on the change of the Bismarckian factor. The overall ﬁt
of the regression is satisfactorily high for a cross-section of only 20 countries.
The coeﬃcient for the annual change in mean income is close to zero and
insigniﬁcant. As it seems there was no direct relationship between the sig-
niﬁcant rise of household welfare in terms of equivalized household income
13Since this is a case of seemingly unrelated regression with identical regressors, we
estimated both equations separately.
14As a robustness check, we also performed regressions including an intercept. In none
of the regressions, the intercept was signiﬁcant.
21and the level of intragenerational distribution in the pension system. Like-
wise, the change of household size did not have an impact on changes of
α. A change of the coeﬃcient of variation by 1 percent came along with an
increase of the Bismarckian factor by about 0.7 percentage points, while a
rise in the skewness of the income distribution by 1 percent was associated
with a decrease of the Bismarckian factor of almost 0.25 percentage points.
Both variables are highly signiﬁcant. The relationship between increased life
expectancy and change of the Bismarckian factor is particularly strong, ex-
hibiting a coeﬃcient of 7.61 percentage points per additional expected life
year. Unfortunately, no data was available as to the correlation between life
expectancy and income. This relationship will be explored in the experiment.
The regression for the generosity index is insigniﬁcant. None of the vari-
ables entering the regression exhibits a signiﬁcant correlation with τ. Hence,
the main channel through which changes in the income distribution and life
expectancy may have exerted an inﬂuence on the design of the pension sys-
tem is the level of intragenerational redistribution rather than its generos-
ity. This ﬁnding contrasts with Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007) who in their
model used both channels contemporaneously (yet, issue-by-issue) in order
to determine the design of the pension system.
The correlation analysis presented in this section has a number of draw-
backs. First, as already mentioned, it remains unclear whether the change in
intragenerational redistribution is actually caused by changes in the shape of
the income distribution and life expectancy or vice versa. Second, the num-
ber of observations is too low in order to run more sophisticated regressions,
taking into account the countries’ heterogeneity and other factors of inﬂu-
22Table 6: Results of OLS regression
Bismarckian factor Generosity index
Variable Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p
Mean −0.075 0.654 −0.045 0.387
Coeﬃcient of Varia-
tion
0.733 0.016 −0.027 0.761
Skewness −0.248 0.009 −0.004 0.877
Life Expectancy 7.610 0.024 1.063 0.278
Household Size 0.009 0.984 0.145 0.314
F =3 .399, p =0 .030 F =0 .803, p =0 .565
R2 =0 .531 R2 =0 .211
Table notes. Variables entered the regression in terms of annual changes in per-
centage points (Bismarckian factor and generosity of the pension system), per-
cent (mean, coeﬃcient of variation, skewness), or life years (life expectancy).
n = 20. Regression through the origin.
ence. Hence, in the next section, we shall present a laboratory experiment
that avoids both problems.
3T h e E x p e r i m e n t
3.1 Experimental design
The experiment was fully computerized. It consisted of two parts. In the ﬁrst
part, the subjects were presented the decision task. In the second part, we
23Figure 2: Sample screen of the decision task
collected their sociodemographics and attitudes. Each subject had only one
decision problem to solve. Figure 2 presents a sample screen of the decision
problem. There were ﬁve columns on the screen. Under each column the
number of“winning points”(labelled“Punkte”) was displayed, corresponding
to the height of the column. The subjects were told that the points resemble
“Mr./Mrs. A to E’s”claims against some (non-speciﬁed) social insurance sys-
tem. Below the winning points, the row labeled“Euro”gave the information
how the winning points would be exchanged for money at the end of the
experiment. This payoﬀ should be interpreted as the actual pension beneﬁt
after redistribution.
By using the control on the lower part of the screen, the participants could
choose the degree of redistribution of (pension) claims of ﬁve hypothetical
persons, ranging from zero to 100 percent. Initially, the control was set at
zero; this is equivalent to a Bismarckian factor of one, that is, there is a per-
24fectly proportional relation between winning points and payoﬀs. By turning
the control to the right, the share of winning points which are redistributed
among individuals increases to up to 100 percent, implying a Bismarckian
factor of zero, that is, a pure Beveridgean pension system. The redistribution
of winning points was highlighted by spotted areas within the columns.
The participants were asked to choose the distribution of payoﬀs they
“liked best”by setting the control appropriately. Thereby the following payoﬀ
rules had to be taken into account: at the end of the experiment two groups,
each including ﬁve subjects, were randomly picked. Each of the selected
subjects was randomly assigned to an income position in its group (denoted
by“Mr./Mrs. A to E”) and given the respective cash payment. The payment
resulted from the income position and the median α of the group. That
is, the Bismarckian factor of each small society was determined by majority
vote from the ﬁve individual values set by the control. This simple incentive
structure is preference-revealing. Strategic considerations, such as coalition
building, could not play a role for the subjects’ decisions due to anonymous
data collection and randomized sampling of groups.
Remember that the index of generosity, the coeﬃcient of variation, the
skewness of the income distribution, and life expectancy were signiﬁcantly
correlated with the Bismarckian factor (in terms of changes of the respective
variables). The mean of the income distribution was not correlated with the
Bismarckian factor and will therefore be neglected in the following. Hence,
the experiment involved 18 treatments. We varied
–t h ef a c t o r ,τ, at which winning points were exchanged into cash pay-
ments in order to test for the eﬀects of increasing the generosity of the pension
25system; {low generosity, high generosity}
– the inequality of the distribution of winning points with respect to vari-
ance, σ, and skewness, λ, in order to test the eﬀect of increasing income
inequality; {low variance and symmetric income distribution, high variance
and symmetric income distribution, low variance and positively skewed in-
come distribution}
- the risk of not receiving a payment (beneﬁt), π, in order to test for the
life-expectancy eﬀect. {no risk, symmetric risk, risk negatively correlated
with number of winning points}
The “no-risk” scenario was conducted according to the previously de-
scribed rules. In the risk scenario, we use the fact that dying after a cer-
tain fraction π of the (ﬁxed) retirement period is equivalent in terms of the
expected value of pension beneﬁts to not receiving the maximum retirement
income with the same probability (see, for example, Diamond, 2003). Hence,
in the case of symmetric risk one out of ﬁve subjects did not receive a pay-
ment, implying a lower average life expectancy of the entire group.15
When risk was negatively correlated with income, the probability of not
receiving a beneﬁt was – as before – on average 20 percent; however, the indi-





where i is the rank in a descending ordering of the distribution of winning
points. In Figure 2, this scenario is indicated by the“Risiko”(risk) row.16 A
15Since the focus of our analysis is on intragenerational redistribution rather than the
intertemporal aspects of the pensions system, this approach appeared us to be a reasonable
short-cut. It also avoids problems as to the experimental design linked to intertemporal
choice such as discounting.
16Note that probabilities are rounded.
26complete list of all treatments and the chosen parameters is given in Table
7.
After the decision task, a standardized questionnaire had to be answered
by the subjects. In the questionnaire, we asked for the ﬁeld of study (ordered
by schools) as well as some knowledge and attitude questions, which will be
explained in detail in Section 3.3. Furthermore, at the beginning of the
experiment subjects had to indicate their sex.
3.2 Procedure
The experiment took place in the cafeteria of the University of Bremen on
July 2nd and 3rd, 2007. Interested students were informed about a scientiﬁc
study on social insurances. Furthermore, they were told that a show-up fee
of e5 was to be paid, that participation would take about 10 minutes, and
that there was a chance of winning up to e1,050. The subjects drew a
lot with a ﬁve-digit number. The ﬁrst three digits determined the treatment
according to Table 7, the fourth and ﬁfth digit gave the group number within
a treatment and the individual income position within the group, respectively.
However, the subjects were not given any information about the meaning of
the number, which was – together with the sex – the initial input necessary
to start the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, that is, after answering the questionnaire, a
lottery started. The ten lot numbers of the winning groups were selected by
an umpire (our secretary) before the experiment and saved on the computers.
Whenever the lot number of the subject coincided with a predetermined
number, the subject was informed that he or she is a winner. In case of a
27Table 7: Parametrization of treatments
Risk of dying
None Symmetric Correlated
Distribution Generosity (π =0 ) ( π =0 .2) (πi = i/
5
j=1j)
Low variance, low 111 121 131
symmetric (τ =0 .1)
distribution high 211 221 231
(vY =0 .35, λ =0 ) ( τ =0 .3)
High variance, low 112 122 132
symmetric (τ =0 .1)
distribution high 212 222 232
(vY =0 .53, λ =0 ) ( τ =0 .3)
Low variance, low 113 123 133
positively skewed (τ =0 .1)
distribution high 213 223 233
(vY =0 .35, λ =0 .97) (τ =0 .3)
Table note. The ﬁgures in the table refer to the treatment number.
v . =coeﬃcient of variation of income distribution, λ . =skewness.
28risk scenario the winning subjects were reminded that due to a second lottery
there may not be a payment despite being a winner. After collecting all data,
the median of the control values (or individual preferences for redistribution,
respectively) of all ﬁve group members was determined. Based on this median
value, the individual payments were calculated. All subjects participating in
the experiment received, independent of whether being a winner or not, the
show-up fee. Per treatment two groups of ﬁve subjects each took part. Hence,
in total 180 students participated in the experiment. Show-up fees summed
up to 900 Euros. The ten winners received a total of e3,379, although one
subject in a risk-treatment did not receive a payment.
3.3 Results
On average, the individually preferred Bismarckian factor α of all subjects
was 0.61.17 There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence (t-test: p =0 .334) between
men (61 percent of the sample, α =0 .60) and women (39%, α =0 .63). There
was a strong correlation between the average individual Bismarckian factor
chosen by the subjects and the expected average α of the other subjects,
which also had a value of 0.61 (Pearson correlation: ρ =0 .441, p<0.01).
The correlation with the level of general basic income support, considered as
necessary for Germany by the subjects (mean: 643 Euros, standard deviation:
247 Euros), and α was as expected negative but insigniﬁcant (ρ = −0.028,
p =0 .711). Between schools there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences (F-test: p =
0.303) although some schools had a tendency for a below-average α (social
sciences: 0.53, education: 0.50) or above-average α (production engineering:
17Germany’s present Bismarckian factor is 0.56 according to our microdata analysis.
290.69).
Because in the beginning of the experiment, subjects were only told that it
deals with some non-speciﬁed social insurance system, we asked what subjects
believed to be “the social insurance”. The results were mixed: 29% thought
of the pension insurance (mean Bismarckian factor: 0.60) followed by health
insurance (26%, 0.62), unemployment insurance (18%, 0.61), long-term care
insurance (6%, 0.66) and accident insurance (4%, 0.54). Only few subjects
chose systems which – in a narrow sense – are not related to social insurance,
such as social aid (11%, 0.65) or“others”(6%, 0.48). There were no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between answer groups with respect to the Bismarckian factor
(F-test, p =0 .301). Neither was there a signiﬁcant diﬀerence (F-test, p =
0.921) between the answers on the question whether responsibility for old-age
provision should be private (8%, 0.62), public (14%, 0.62) or jointly (78%,
0.60). The same insigniﬁcance (F-test, p =0 .437) could be found for the
self-assessment regarding risk attitude with the categories risk-averse (50%,
0.62), risk-neutral (32%, 0.58) and risk-loving (18%, 0.62). On average, the
subjects estimated the employees’ share in social insurance contributions in
Germany to be 24 percent.18 Again, there was no signiﬁcant correlation
with the Bismarckian factor (ρ = −0.106, p =0 .158), although there was
a slight tendency that subjects who estimated a high share preferred more
redistribution.
The descriptive results presented so far are neither representative for the
entire population nor is it permissible to refer to the absolute level of the
Bismarckian factor. In fact, homogeneity of the random sample allows com-
18The actual employee’s share was about 21% in Germany in 2007.
30paring the diﬀerent treatments. Any diﬀerences in the preferred level of
redistribution result exclusively from the exogenous variation of the stimuli.
Whenever individuals respond to monetary incentives, these treatment eﬀects
in the laboratory turn out to be evidence for analogous eﬀects of changes of
the income distribution and life expectancy in the real-world.
Because the public pension system and thus the level of intragenerational
redistribution within the pension system are based on democratic majority
votes, we do not use the individual α’s but – in line with the incentive struc-
ture of the experiment – the median α’s of diﬀerent groups. As noted in
the Introduction, the individual decisions regarding the Bismarckian factor
were made from behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”. This implies that
subjects were assigned their positions in the society only at the end of the
experiment. This should guarantee that subjects take on a neutral position
and choose only societally beneﬁcial levels of economic inequality. Further-
more, in reality there exists a substantial degree of uncertainty about one’s
own future economic situation. Another advantage of the“veil of ignorance”
is that subjects had no information about their fellow group members. This
anonymity allows to construct by permutation from the ten group members of
each of the 18 treatments a total of 252 group observations. Accordingly, we
had 4,536 independent observations of homogenous groups in our regression
analysis.
Table 8 shows the results of an OLS regression in which the Bismar-
ckian factor (in percent) is the endogenous variable. Exogenous were the
treatment dummies high generosity, high variance, positively skewed income
distribution, high life expectancy, and life expectancy positively correlated




High generosity 3.610 0.000
High variance 1.980 0.000
Positively skewed distribution -5.286 0.000
High life expectancy -0.583 0.218
Life expectancy positively corre-
lated with income
2.099 0.000
Dependent variable: Bismarckian factor in percent. n =4 ,536
F =7 5 .052,p (F)=0 .000,R 2 =0 .075
32with income. The benchmark case is a treatment with low generosity, low
variance and symmetric income distribution, and low life expectancy uncor-
related with income. While the regression explains only a small part of total
variance in the data (in experiments the noise is usually quite large), it is
nevertheless highly signiﬁcant.
The average Bismarckian factor (in percent) was about 58% in the bench-
mark case. Increasing the exchange rate of payments for winning points (that
is, moving to a“high generosity”scenario) raised the Bismarckian factor sig-
niﬁcantly by approximately 3.6 percentage points. Increasing the variance
of the income distribution, increased the Bismarckian factor signiﬁcantly by
approximately two percentage points. In the treatments with a more posi-
tively skewed income distribution, α was signiﬁcantly smaller (by about 5.3
percentage points). In contrast to the empirical analysis, our experiment
allows to diﬀerentiate between symmetric and asymmetric changes of life ex-
pectancy. While the symmetric increase of life expectancy had no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the Bismarckian factor, an asymmetric change had a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect on the Bismarckian factor (2.1 percentage points).
4 Discussion
In this section we compare and interpret the results gained from the analysis
of the LIS data and the experiment. Table 9 provides a stylized overview.
The analysis of the LIS data showed a strong positive correlation be-
tween the size of the pension system in terms of the generosity index and
the Bismarckian factor. A more generous pension system came along with






Life expectancy ↑ symmetric: ↔
correlated with income: ↑
Table note. Impact of changes in the left-hand variables on α.
less intragenerational redistribution. Such a negative correlation between
the level of intragenerational redistribution and the size of the pension sys-
tem also has been investigated by, for example, Cremer and Pestieau (1998),
Casamatta et al. (2000a, 2000b), K¨ othenb¨ urger et al. (2008), and Rossignol
and Taugourdeau (2006). Our empirical result is clearly conﬁrmed by the
experiment, where the change of the generosity index was a pure treatment
eﬀect, that is, fully exogenous. How does this result relate to Boulding’s
(1962) hypothesis of a “modest table” and a “high table”?
According to the LIS data the pension beneﬁt of the bottom quintile
increased by 1.935% (std. error: 0.577) per year – that is less than the mean
pension beneﬁt of all pensioners (2.624%, s.e.: 0.972) but a bit more then
the mean of (equivalized) household net income (1.609%, s.e.: 0.405; see
Table 4). This highlights – with the caveat that the mean diﬀerences are not
statistically signiﬁcant (the former mean diﬀerence is 0.689 with p =0 .230;
34the latter one is 0.327 with p =0 .594)19 – that Boulding’s “modest table”
grows with increasing wealth of the society rather than being absolutely ﬁxed.
It points to the fact that in OECD countries poverty is more a relative than an
absolute concept. In other words: income support is given in order to allow
people to participate in a society’s usual activities (although at a lower level),
and less as a means of avoiding poverty in the sense of famine, malnutrition,
and homelessness. On the other hand, the minimum pension seems to have
grown less than the mean pension such that the relative distance between
minimum pension and mean pension beneﬁt has signiﬁcantly increased by
4.3% (p=0.084).
Result 1: The minimum pension (Boulding’s “modest” table) is
a weakly superior good.
Both parts of the analysis brought about a negative relationship between
intragenerational redistribution and changes in the variance of the income
distribution. It straightforward to show that the degree of inequality in the
pension system (in terms of the coeﬃcient of variation) is related to the
degree of inequality in the income distribution as follows:
vP = αvY . (5)
Accordingly, vP is linear homogenous in vY , and an increase in α that is
caused by an increase in vY unambiguously leads to an increase in inequality
of the pension system. For example, consider the experiment’s benchmark
19One should keep in mind that the LIS analysis considers intragenerational redistri-
bution in a broader sense than just minimum pensions, some of the transfers even being
regressive, such that the pure minimum pension change may be stronger.
35case with Y =( 1 ,000;1,500;2,000;2,500;3,000) and vY =0 .3536. The
high-variance scenario with Y  = (500;1,250;2,000;2,250;3,500) increased
the variation coeﬃcient by 50% (vY  =0 .5303) and induced our subjects to
state α’s about 1.980 percentage points higher. As a consequence of this,
inequality in the pension system rose from vP =0 .2051 to vP  =0 .3181, that
is, by about 55%.
However, this observation seems to contradict the literature. Conde-Ruiz
and Profeta (2007) recently argued that a winning coalition of the rich and
the poor (high inequality condition) could implement a Beveridgean pen-
sion system, while a low degree of inequality would allow the middle-class
to introduce a Bismarckian system. Also from the perspective of the im-
partial observer model, this result comes as a surprise. An isolated increase
in the variance is equivalent with a regressive transfer. Consequently, with
a concave welfare function one would expect to see lower instead of higher
Bismarckian factors.
Although we neglect the usual equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ in our experi-
ment, social planners and real world politicians will have to take this trade
oﬀ into account, naturally limiting the level of intragenerational redistribu-
tion in a society. In an experiment with considerable ﬁnancial incentives,
Traub et al. (2008) showed that subjects put relatively high weight on eﬃ-
ciency consideration (in terms of Pareto dominance) as compared to equity
consideration (in terms of transfer and Lorenz dominance) when faced with
an equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. Note also that from an empirical point of view
the transfer principle is highly controversial. Using questionnaire-based ex-
periments, Amiel and Cowell (1999) showed that between 53 to 74 percent
36of their subjects rejected the transfer principle in the diﬀerent contexts of
inequality measurement, poverty, and social welfare.
Amiel and Cowell (1999) concluded that people tend to judge inequality in
terms of income diﬀerence (rather than income levels directly) and the overall
shape of the income distributions (rather than only the incomes involved in
the transfer). We explain the violation of the transfer principle by randomiza-
tion preferences (for experimental evidence see Bernasconi, 2002; and Traub
et al., 2008): self-interested social planners might perceive a trade-oﬀ be-
tween“fairness”in terms of inequality and the chance of excelling the others.
Randomization preferences imply that a probability mixture of two original
(very promising but unequal) income distributions between which the social
planner is indiﬀerent from under the veil of ignorance is preferred over the
two original income distributions. Such preferences violate the betweeness
axiom of expected utility theory (see Chew, 1989) but may be opportune if
the social planner looks for a“fair”procedure (for example, tossing a coin) to
justify “unfair” outcomes. Our empirical and experimental results suggests,
that the weight that is given to the chance of being among the top recip-
ients of pension beneﬁts increases disproportionately high with increasing
background inequality of the income distribution.
Result 2: Increasing inequality of the income distribution in-
duces the social planner to put less weight on outcome fairness
and more weight on procedural fairness. Hence the level of in-
tragenerational redistribution in the pension system is decreased
and, thus, the Bismarckian factor increased.
Table 9 shows that an increase of the skewness of the income distribu-
37tion unambiguously decreased the Bismarckian factor. We believe that this
results can be traced back to an increase of relative deprivation. Seidl et
al. (2006) experimentally estimated Parducci’s (1965, 1968, 1974, 1982) so-
called judgement equation which forms part of his range-frequency theory.
Their estimate was given by
Ji = −0.028 + 0.855 × Ri +0 .187 × Fi, (6)
where Ji is the judgement of stimulus i, Ri =( Si − minj{Sj}/(maxj{Sj}−
minj{Sj}) is the range component, Fi =( ri − 1)/(N − 1) is the frequency
component, ri is the rank of stimulus i,a n dN is the total number of stim-
uli. Using equation (6), we can easily illustrate how the evaluation of in-
come distributions changes if they become more skewed. We consider the
benchmark case with S =( 1 ,000;1,500;2,000;2,500;3,000), ﬁrst. Here,
we obtain an average judgement of 0.493. For the income distribution that
is positively skewed (but has the same mean income and variance), S =
(1,250;1,600;1,750;2,100;3,300), we compute only 0.378.20 Temkin’s work
(1986, 1993) suggests that the latter society is less happy. Inequality aver-
sion that is driven by the complaints of the poor about their situation in
relation to that of the rich should therefore be higher in the treatment with
a positively skewed income distribution. Note that Devooght (2003) found
experimental support for Temkin’s model, too.
If inequality aversion – an thus the size of the Bismarckian factor – is
20In principle, the judgement should be constrained to the [0,1]-interval and the weighs
should add up to one. However, the empirical estimate brought about slight deviations
from the theoretical model. For more details on range-frequency theory, we refer to the
article by Seidl et al. (2006).
38driven by relative deprivation, this creates a paradox: though we actually
observe lower α’s, the amount of relative deprivation that is felt by the social
planner does not decrease. It is straightforward to show, that the judgement
given in equation (6) is independent of α. An intuitive explanation for that
is, that a change of the Bismarckian factor does only inﬂuence the dispersion
of pension beneﬁts but not the skewness of their distribution (the skewness of
the positively skewed distribution is 0.97 as stated in Table 7). In other words:
though relative deprivation might induce redistribution policy, changing the
level of intragenerational distribution is an insuﬃcient measure to decrease
relative deprivation in the society.
Result 3: Increasing the skewness of the income distribution
deepens relative deprivation in the society, augments the social
planner’s preference for intragenerational redistribution and, thus,
decreases the Bismarckian factor. However, increasing the level
of intragenerational redistribution does not change the skewness
of the distribution of pension beneﬁts.
Finally, we comment on the relationship between life expectancy and Bis-
marckian factor. The LIS data did not let us diﬀerentiate between symmetric
and asymmetric increases of life expectancy. However, there is suﬃcient evi-
dence in the literature for a positive eﬀect of income on life expectancy (see,
for example, Deaton and Paxson, 2001; and Attanasio and Emerson, 2003)
to assume that the LIS data, too, reﬂect this asymmetry. Hence, concerning
the eﬀect of an asymmetric increase of life expectancy on the Bismarckian
factor, empirical and experimental results again are perfectly in line with
each other.
39From an economic perspective, increasing life expectancy at a given re-
tirement age implies a higher risk of being poor and having to rely on state
transfers during retirement. The pension system covers the income risks in-
volved with unknown life expectancy. If life expectancy increases across the
board, that is, symmetrically, one would expect the generosity of the pension
system τ to increase in order to guarantee the same replacement income as
before. However, though the respective coeﬃcients were positive, the cor-
relation analysis in Section 2.5 showed no signiﬁcant relationship between
generosity index and life expectancy. In case of an increase of life expectancy
which favors the rich, there is an obvious, rational explanation for lowering
the degree of intragenerational redistribution. To work out our argument,
let us assume that life expectancy of the average citizen remains unchanged
and that life expectancy of the rich (poor) increases (decreases). On the one
hand, this implies an increase of the pension system’s generosity because the
rich receive higher beneﬁts than the poor. On the other hand, this eﬀect is
counteracted by a Harsanyi-Friedman type social planner who realizes that
the expected value of pension beneﬁts of the rich (poor) has increased (fallen).
From the social planner’s perspective, it is relatively more proﬁtable to share
“the cake”among the rich pensioners. The ﬂat component of the pension sys-
tem will be reduced in favor of the earnings-related component such that we
observe an increase of the Bismarckian factor and a corresponding reduction
of intragenerational redistribution. Although viewed from a diﬀerent angle,
this is similar to the life expectancy eﬀect described by Borck (2007) and
Gorski et al. (2007).
Result 4: Asymmetric changes in life expectancy in favor of the
40rich diminish the expected utility of pensions at the lower end of
the income distribution, reduce the social planner’s preference for
intragenerational redistribution and, thus, increase the Bismarck-
ian factor.
This result is nicely reﬂected in the experimental results reported in Table
8. Comparing the benchmark group with the group that was treated with a
symmetric increase in life expectancy shows that the treatment eﬀect was in-
signiﬁcant (a slightly negative value of −0.583 percentage points is recorded).
There is obviously no reason to change α as the expected utility of the pension
system is independent of it. We do not know the subjects’ utility functions,
but we can directly compare the expected value of the pension beneﬁt under
both treatments. When introducing risk, it dropped from e200 to e160.
The generosity of the pension system was given, so the social planner could
not go against it by increasing “the cake”. Under the asymmetric treatment,
the expected value of the pension system was dependent on the Bismarckian
factor: e6.67×α+e160. Hence, the subjects had to balance the eﬃciency
gain of a higher α with its side eﬀect of higher inequality. In the experiment,
this yielded a Bismarckian factor more than 2 percentage points higher than
in the symmetric scenario.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an analysis of the long-term change in OECD
countries’ pension systems. In a ﬁrst step, using microdata drawn from the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), we showed that there is some empirical
41evidence for a reduction of intragenerational redistribution in public pension
systems, as suggested (but not yet empirically conﬁrmed) in the recent liter-
ature. As a measurement for the level of intragenerational redistribution in
the pension system, we employed the Bismarckian factor. Though the major-
ity of countries decreased intragenerational redistribution, accompanied by
a rise in the generosity of the pension system, the change proved to be in-
signiﬁcant at conventional statistical terms. We would answer the question:
“Back to Bismarck?” in the aﬃrmative. It should be kept in mind, however,
that the empirical evidence is only weak.
The main focus of our analysis was on the factors determining societal
preferences for intragenerational redistribution in public social insurance sys-
tems, the ﬁrst pillar of the public pension system in particular. Our proceed-
ing comprised two diﬀerent analytical steps: a cross-country study based on
LIS data and an economic laboratory experiment. While the empirical anal-
ysis brought about interesting correlations between the Bismarckian factor
and some variables of interest, it had some limitations due to low sample size
and unclear causal relationships. The laboratory experiment had the clear
advantage of enabling us to model changes in potential explanatory variables
as exogenous treatment variables. While it is hardly possible to translate
the subjects’ absolute distributional preferences from the experiment into
the real world, this approach allowed to study causal relations. Furthermore,
while the empirical analysis was naturally limited to 20 observations, the
experiment was conducted with a sample of 180 student subjects from which
we generated by permutation more than 4,500 independent observations.
Our results can be summarized as follows: Empirical analysis and labora-
42tory experiment produced identical marginal eﬀects. Factors that increased
the Bismarckian factor (decreased intragenerational redistribution) were in-
creases in the generosity of the pension system and the variance of the income
distribution as well as asymmetric increases of life expectancy in favor of the
rich. Higher skewness of the income distributions decreased the Bismarckian
factor.
We explain our results in the following ways. In OECD countries poverty
is more a relative than an absolute concept, that is, income support is given
in order to allow people to participate in society’s usual activities rather
than just as a means of providing for subsistence. The minimum pension (or
Boulding’s“modest table”) therefore increases with society’s wealth, however,
at a less than proportional rate. The relative importance of intragenerational
redistribution falls and the Bismarckian factor increases (Result 1).
Falling intragenerational redistribution following increasing variance of
the income distribution is somewhat unexpected and can be explained by a
violation of the transfer principle in people’s preferences. Because of ran-
domization preferences the social planner in cases of increasing inequality
puts less weight on outcome fairness and more weight on procedural fairness
which causes the Bismarckian factor to increase (Result 2). Increasing skew-
ness, on the other hand, increases the level of intragenerational redistribution
because relative deprivation in the society becomes more pronounced which
then augments the social planner’s preference for redistribution. Notwith-
standing changing the Bismarckian factor is an inappropriate means of alle-
viating relative deprivation because it reduces only the dispersion of beneﬁts
but not the skewness of their distribution (Result 3).
43Increasing life expectancy implies a higher risk of drifting into old-age
poverty and having to rely on state transfers. However, a symmetric increase
of life expectancy for all (income) groups in society would rather increase
generosity than change the level of intragenerational redistribution. Hence,
only an asymmetric change of life expectancy in favor of the rich had a
signiﬁcant impact on the Bismarckian factor. Under these circumstances,
the social planner realizes that the expected value of the pension beneﬁts of
the rich has increased and therefore ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to direct transfers
towards them by strengthening the earnings-related element of the pension
system (Result 4).
Taking fundamental societal developments – in particular globalization
and demographic change – into consideration our results yield the follow-
ing important insights. Both developments tend to strengthen the earnings-
related component of the public pension systems’ ﬁrst pillar, unless they
induce a substantial change of the skewness of the distribution of retirement
incomes. In the process of globalization barriers to trade and factor mobil-
ity are removed. Factor price equalization generates welfare gains for the
countries involved, although the gains may not be shared equally within a
country. In terms of our analysis we expect mean income and (possibly) the
variance of the income distribution to rise which – according to Results 1
and 2 – decreases the preferred level of intragenerational redistribution. The
ageing of societies may move the pension system into the same direction,
depending on whether life expectancy increases asymmetrically or in favor of
the rich, as Result 3 points out. Evidence from past decades shows that life
expectancy increased the Bismarckian factor as if life expectancy changed
44asymmetrically.
However, there is one major counterforce to the reduction of intragenera-
tional redistribution which comes from an increase in the skewness of income
distributions. Past data indicates that skewness increased substantially in
OECD countries, and there are few signs that this development will not con-
tinue in the future. Globalization, for example, tends to reduce the labor
share in national income. Upcoming old-age poverty is a major concern in
many countries’ political debate nowadays.
Globalization and ageing may even interact in some respects. The LIS
analysis showed that while changes of the income distribution were insignif-
icant with respect to changes of the level of redistribution, changes of gen-
erosity had a signiﬁcant impact. Globalization leads – in the ﬁrst place –
to an increase of mean income, but not necessarily generosity (although Re-
sult 1 indicates that preferences change accordingly). In an ageing society,
however, we expect the power of the old generation to increase which allows
them to vote in favor of a more generous pension system, as argued in Brown-
ing’s (1975) seminal paper. When times of globalization and ageing coincide
(as projected for the next decades), mean income and generosity increase,
leading to a higher Bismarckian factor. It should be noted that the voting
power (or gerontocracy) argument introduces an element of intergenerational
redistribution into our reasoning.
Under these circumstances the design of future pension systems remains
an unresolved question. Whether pension system will move even further
“back to Bismarck” depends on the strength of the skewness eﬀect relative
to the other impact factors shown to be relevant in our analysis. But even
45if pension systems take a turn – induced by society’s concern about relative
deprivation – to becoming more Beveridgean in the future, this will not solve
the problem of relative deprivation due to the inability of the Bismarckian
factor to change the skewness of the distribution of pension beneﬁts.
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